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Wealth Inequality, Educational Environment and School Enrolment: Evidence from Mexico 
Using data from the extended section of the 2010 Mexican census (2.9 million 
households), we study how school enrolment is associated with wealth inequality and 
with the educational environment the child is exposed to at the household and municipal 
levels. We provide robust evidence of wealth inequality as a negative predictor of school 
enrolment for children in primary, secondary and high school age ranges while a positive 
role is played by the educational environment. Through the introduction of interaction 
terms, we account for how economic and educational variables are intertwined at both 
the household and the municipal level, and we are able to illustrate the considerable 
heterogeneity in the role of adult education for households at different standards of 
living.  
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1 Introduction 
A number of recent contributions have put a spotlight on economic inequality, on its upward trend in the last 
decades and on the implications this has for our societies; these include academic articles (Kanbur & Stiglitz, 
2016; Neves, Afonso, & Silva, 2016; Piketty, 2015; Saez & Zucman, 2016) as well as successful books 
addressing the general public (Milanović, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson & Picket, 2010). 
Among the social outcomes of major interest for academics and policymakers is education, which is a key 
component of human capital, an engine of growth, a universal human right, and a domain featuring in the most 
widespread multidimensional indices of societal progress, as well as in the main global development initiatives 
(e.g. Human Development Index, Multidimensional Poverty Index, Millennium Development Goals, Post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goals, etc.). Shedding light on the relationship between economic inequality 
and educational outcomes is important; if a negative relationship exists between the two, greater inequality 
would be associated with lower educational outcomes and therefore bear a significant cost for societies. 
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In this paper we investigate wealth inequality as a predictor of school enrolment in Mexico. A body of literature 
which crosses the fields of economics, sociology and child development explores how educational outcomes 
may be affected by economic variables (e.g. Basu & Van, 1998; Galor & Zeira, 1993; Gutiérrez & Tanaka, 
2009; Mayer, 2001) and by the educational environment the child is immersed in (Crane, 1991; Cunha & 
Heckman, 2007; Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994; Strulik, 2013). We contribute to the literature by studying the 
association between wealth inequality and school enrolment through an empirical analysis which uses large 
scale data and goes beyond the mere incorporation of economic and educational variables by explicitly 
accounting for how these are intertwined.  In particular, we contend, and our evidence confirms this hypothesis, 
that not only are economic variables and educational environment important predictors of school enrolment, 
but they also interact with one another and they do so at both the household and the wider levels (i.e. within 
and beyond the household). Accounting for such interconnections improves our estimations and enables us to 
illustrate how the role of adult education in enhancing child educational outcomes may vary for households at 
different standards of living. In this way, we also contribute to a fuller understanding of the demand side of 
education, which has a large potential for policy intervention (Handa, 2002) and whose importance for 
developing countries is advocated by the recent work of Lincove (2015). 
Our empirical analysis uses cross-sectional data from the extended-questionnaire section of the 2010 Mexican 
census, which covers around 2.9 million households and is statistically representative at municipal level (the 
lowest political and administrative level in Mexico). We study the probability that a child is enrolled in school 
using multilevel logit models where the dependent variable is the dichotomous status of being enrolled/not 
being enrolled in school for children aged between 6 and 18. In order to allow for the possibility that enrolment 
dynamics may differ at different age levels, we investigate separately the three subsamples which correspond 
to primary, secondary and high school ages – i.e. the 6-12, 13-15 and 16-18 age ranges, respectively. For each 
of the three age ranges, we find strong evidence of wealth inequality as a negative predictor of school 
enrolment. Our results are robust to the adoption of alternative estimation strategies (logit and linear probability 
models with standard errors clustered at municipal level) and different inequality indices (Gini, Theil and 
Atkinson), as well as to the split of our sample by child gender and standard of living. 
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The interplay between economic and educational variables is modelled through two interaction terms – one 
between household wealth and the maximum years of formal education attained by a household member and 
one between wealth and educational attainments in the municipality. Both interaction terms are highly 
significant and improve the ability of our models to fit the data; in addition, the one at municipal level also 
proves to be crucial for determining the sign and significance of wealth inequality. The nuances of how the 
educational environment relates to school enrolment at different levels of wealth for our three age ranges are 
graphically described by plotting average predicted probabilities of enrolment. A final offer of our paper relates 
to municipal random effects. The use of multilevel models enables us to provide illustrations of how municipal 
effects on school enrolment can differ substantially, even in the case of contiguous municipalities.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we lay out the conceptual framework for our 
analysis, with a focus on the ways in which economic inequality and the educational milieu surrounding the 
child at both household and wider levels may affect school enrolment. In section 3 we outline our empirical 
strategy by describing the models we employ, the data we use, the derivation of our wealth indicator and the 
explanatory variables included in our estimations. In section 4 we present our results, focusing first on our 
main results and then discussing additional insights and municipal heterogeneity. In the final section, we 
summarise and conclude by highlighting the main lessons and policy implications stemming from our study. 
 
2 School enrolment: economic inequality and the educational environment 
2.a Economic inequality and education 
The potential impact of economic inequality on school enrolment has been traditionally discussed in the 
literature by looking at both the demand and supply of education. With regard to the latter, the channel is a 
political economy mechanism whereby quality and quantity of the provision of a certain public good depend 
on citizens’ willingness to contribute to it through taxation. Within this argument, the existence of inequality 
would lower the amount of resources available for the public provision of education because the rich would 
send their children to private schools and would try to forgo contributing to the funding of public education 
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(Epple & Romano, 1996). This would result in a lower supply of public education with negative effects on 
schooling – see Tanaka’s (2003) model and its extension developed by Gutiérrez and Tanaka (2009).  
With regard to the demand side, the bulk of the literature addressing the effect of inequality on schooling 
focuses on access. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that the distribution of wealth is important because, given the 
imperfection of credit markets and therefore the existence of glitches in borrowing opportunities, in an 
economy where wealth is held by a few only a minority will be able to invest in education. Similar results are 
obtained by Perotti (1993), García-Peñalosa (1995), Chiu (1998) and Checchi (2003), although for Perotti and 
García-Peñalosa the role of inequality may be positive for very poor economies. The focus of these papers is 
affordability of education and the economic barrier to enrolment, an argument which is expressed clearly in 
Basu and Van’s (1998) ‘luxury axiom’, whereby education would be “a luxury good in the household's 
consumption in the sense that a poor household cannot afford to consume this good” (p. 415). Along these 
lines, overall inequality may be detrimental to school enrolment if it jeopardises poverty reduction, as indeed 
Iniguez-Montiel (2014) showed to be the case for Mexico.  
Further mechanisms relate to a series of phenomena, attitudes and behaviours which are corrosive to the social 
fabric and are shown to be more likely to occur in more unequal societies. A fast-growing multidisciplinary 
literature shows that economic inequality is associated with lower levels of trust, social cohesion, civic 
engagement, agreeableness, as well as increased levels of individualism, self-enhancement and various sorts 
of antisocial or unethical behaviour.i It can be argued that economic inequality may have an impact on the 
demand of education through these channels when one considers that education is valued not only for 
instrumental reasons such as gaining a better wage, but also for intrinsic reasons such as becoming a better 
person in society (Reid, 1998). By triggering dynamics which are prejudicial to social coexistence, the potential 
effect of inequality on the demand of education for intrinsic reasons can be hypothesised to be a negative one; 
for example, Dincer (2011) shows a positive relationship between schooling and trust. As for the instrumental 
motivation, the effect of inequality on school enrolment may be negative if inequality within society fosters a 
myopic approach to lifetime consumption which prioritises immediate, over future, material gratification; 
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alternatively, it may be positive if investment in education is perceived as a tool for climbing the economic 
ladder (Topel, 1997; Welch, 1999).  
2.b The relevance of the educational environment 
While undoubtedly important, economic factors are only part of the story and other variables affect educational 
outcomes (Cameron & Heckman, 2001; Ray, 2000). We focus in particular on the educational environment the 
child is immersed in, both within and beyond the household - in particular, the level of education possessed by 
adults in the household and in the municipality. We maintain that not only is the educational environment 
important at both levels, but that it also interacts with economic variables – in our case, household wealth and 
mean municipal wealth. 
2.b.1 Educational attainments of adults within the household 
The importance of the educational environment surrounding the child in the household is well documented. 
Connelly and Zheng (2003), Dostie and Jayaraman (2006) and Bhalotra (2007), among others, provide sound 
quantitative evidence from developing countries that parents’ education is a strong a predictor of children’s 
educational outcomes. Handa (2002) finds that increasing parents’ education has a far greater potential for 
boosting enrolment in a developing setting than raising household income. Basit (2013) shows that the 
positive role on educational achievements also extends to family members in the household other than the 
parents. A number of reasons have been given by educational specialists for the relevance of the educational 
environment within the household. The influential work of Grolnick and Slowiaczek (1994) argues that 
children’s school achievement is affected by three components of parents’ involvement – personal (caring 
about school), cognitive (exposing the child to intellectual stimulating material) and behavioural (attending 
school events), and that all three are directly or indirectly positively related to parents’ education. The 
beneficial effect of parents’ education on pupils’ academic achievements through education-oriented values, 
involvement and ability to help with homework (whether objective or perceived) is also illustrated by the 
work of Davis-Kean (2005) and Hornby and Lafaele (2011). 
We hypothesise that the level of education of adults in the household interacts with economic status, i.e. that 
its effect varies at different levels of household wealth. The dynamics behind this interaction are complex and 
this interaction can occur in a number of ways. For an illustrative example, consider the following pairs of 
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households: i) two equally affluent households A and B, where in A adults are well educated and gained their 
wealth through professional jobs (e.g. surgeon or lawyer) while in B they have very little formal education and 
manage a restaurant; ii) two households C and D where all adults hold a university degree, but while C has 
become wealthy through highly paid jobs D has not. It is clear that there will be no difference between A and 
B in terms of affordability of education, or between C and D in terms of the education-related environmental 
factors described above. However, the confluence of educational and economic accomplishments in the case 
of A and C is likely to enhance the belief in material returns on schooling, which would yield a motivational 
premium for children to demand education as well as for parents to act in order to extend their children’s 
duration of schooling. 
2.b.2 Educational attainments of adults beyond the household 
The conceptual underpinnings for the relevance of the wider educational environment lie in the notion that 
individuals’ behaviour is influenced by those around them – see Crane’s (1991) ‘epidemic’ approach to school 
dropout and Kling, Liebman and Katz’s (2007) study of neighbourhood effects on educational outcomes. 
Evidence from Mexico of the existence of neighbouring effects on schooling decisions is provided by Bobonis 
and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009). The motivational component has a key role in Jencks and 
Mayer’s (1990) socialization theory whereby adults in the neighbourhood act as role models, as well as in 
Strulik’s (2013) framework where the aggregate behaviour of the community promotes the establishment of 
pro- or anti-schooling norms. A more educated environment can also be an incentive to stay in education for 
the desire to culturally fit in society, to meet higher educational requirements on the job market and for 
educational assortative mating purposes (Blossfeld, 2009; Nielsen & Svarer, 2009). In addition, similarly to 
Grolnick and Slowiaczek’s (1994) cognitive aspect of parents’ involvement, Cunha and Heckman (2007) argue 
that a more educated environment also fosters children’s learning and academic achievements thanks to the 
intellectual stimuli the child is exposed to. 
As was the case for the household level, we hypothesise that educational and economic variables interact also 
at a wider level. To see the rationale for hypothesising an interplay between educational aggregates and mean 
municipal wealth, the role of the latter as an explanatory variable for individual school enrolment should first 
be clarified. It is widely recognised that in models which explain individual-level social outcomes (e.g. 
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individual educational attainments, health status, life satisfaction, etc.) by means of both individual and 
aggregate economic variables (e.g. household and municipal income or wealth), the aggregate variables play 
the role of relative disadvantage or relative deprivation – see, inter alia, Luttmer (2005) and Gravelle and Sutton 
(2009). Following McLoyd (1990), Mayer (2001) and Hackman, Farah and Meaney (2010), relative 
deprivation is expected to negatively affect educational outcomes by decreasing children’s willingness to study 
or stay in school, lowering parents’ expectations and increasing stress due to lower social rank. Mayer (2001) 
contends that relative deprivation can lead to isolation and alienation; similarly, a link between relative 
deprivation and social exclusion can be found in Sen (1983) and Bossert, D’Ambrosio and Peragine (2007). 
As argued by Mayer (2001), isolation may affect the adherence to the norms and the absorption of the values 
which are prevailing in society. If this is the case, then the relevance of the mechanisms related to the 
educational environment discussed above can be expected to vary at different levels of relative deprivation. 
For example, the strength of role model (Jencks & Mayer, 1990) or schooling norm (Strulik, 2013) mechanisms 
as motivational drives for demanding education will presumably be lower for more relative deprived and 
alienated individuals.  
 
3 Empirical operationalization 
3.a Econometric strategy 
The willingness to investigate school enrolment using explanatory variables at both household and aggregate 
levels poses an estimation challenge which needs to be dealt with. Observations’ independence can be 
questioned because children living in the same municipality share contextual factors, which are important for 
school enrolment and vary across municipalities (e.g. cost of schooling, quality of education, etc.). When the 
observations are not independent, one of the basic assumptions behind multivariate regression is violated 
because residuals are not uncorrelated. Overlooking this clustering leads to an underestimation of standard 
errors and a bias in results, with a higher probability of a type I error (Moulton, 1986, 1990). One option to 
deal with this problem is to use customary models with standard errors clustered at the suspected level of non-
independency, which provide reliable estimates through increased confidence intervals accounting for 
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correlation between observations in the same cluster. Another option is to estimate multilevel (also called 
‘hierarchical’) models with varying aggregate-level intercept terms, which model within-cluster error 
correlation directly and allow for the estimation of residual components at each level in the hierarchy. Given 
that we have a large number of clusters (2,452 municipalities), in our case both methods are viable (Bryan & 
Jenkins, 2016; Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008; Wooldridge, 2003). We opt for multilevel models because, 
in addition to allowing the correct estimation of standard errors, it also provides estimates of municipal random 
effects (Gelman & Hill, 2009; Scott, Simonoff, & Marx, 2013), which we employ to provide a graphical 
illustration of the spatial heterogeneity in school enrolment across municipalities. We carry out a log-likelihood 
ratio test for the null hypothesis that the variance of the estimated municipal random intercepts is zero – i.e. 
that there is no significant difference between the data fit of multilevel models vs models where clustering is 
unaccounted for.ii For each of our models the test confirms that the clustered structure of our data is relevant 
and not accounting for this clustering would be erroneous. Finally, to ensure that our results are not contingent 
on the choice of multilevel logit models, for all our specifications we also run customary logit models and 
linear probability models where standard errors are clustered at municipal level. These models confirm our 
results and are available upon request. 
Our dependent variable is the individual-level dichotomous status of being enrolled/not being enrolled in 
school for children aged 6-18. In order to allow for the possibility that enrolment dynamics may differ at 
different age ranges and to detect this heterogeneity, we split our sample into three subsamples corresponding 
to typical primary, secondary and high school ages and investigate them separately. This means that for each 
specification we will estimate three models based on different samples – the subsamples of pupils in the 6-12, 
13-15 and 16-18 age brackets. In Mexico children are expected to start primary school at age 6, secondary 
school at age 13 and then move to high school, with both secondary and high school lasting three years. 
Attending secondary school is mandatory but enforcement is weak; attending high school was made mandatory 
in 2011 (the year after the census was carried out), and as in the case of secondary school there is no effective 
mechanism to enforce enrolment. It should be noted that, while it seems reasonable to split our sample 
according to these age groups, we do not assume that all pupils aged 6-12, 13-15 and 16-18 enrolled in school 
are in fact enrolled in primary, secondary and high school, respectively – the census only asks whether the 
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pupil is enrolled in school or not. In addition, while the described 3+3 scheme is the general rule applying to 
the very large majority of schooling patterns in Mexico, it is possible to find secondary schools or high schools 
which last 4 years. It can also happen that some students enter school late or repeat years, as noted by the 
Mexican Secretariat of Public Education (SEP, 2012). 
Our level-1 explanatory variables of interest are household wealth and education. The latter enters our analysis 
as the maximum years of formal schooling among the adults in the household – results are unchanged if this 
variable is replaced by the average years of education in the household. Our wealth variable is an asset index 
constructed using information on the quality of the dwelling (such as floors, walls and ceilings), access to basic 
utilities (source of water, rubbish collection and sewage) and durable asset ownership (for example, computers, 
mobile phones and cars). The index is computed using principal components analysis (PCA) on the correlation 
matrix of the indicators as for Filmer and Pritchett (1999); in particular, we follow the procedure derived by 
Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) which better accounts for the discrete nature of the indicators used.iii The 
correlation between our municipality mean asset index and the official municipality mean income estimated 
by the governmental agency Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, 
2013) is reassuringly high: 0.81 for linear correlation and 0.91 for rank correlation. Our level-2 (municipal 
level) explanatory variables of interest are municipal wealth inequality, mean municipal wealth and a variable 
labelled as ‘Ratio’ accounting for the educational environment at municipal level. Wealth inequality is 
measured using the Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 to 1 for, respectively, minimum and maximum level 
of inequality, and which can be intuitively interpreted as the extent to which a distribution departs from 
equality. We create three ‘Ratio’ variables tailored on the role model or schooling norm which is most directly 
relevant for each age-specific model; hence, for our models addressing age ranges 6-12, 13-15 and 16-18 we 
employ, respectively, the ratio of adults in the municipality having completed primary school (Primary Ratio), 
secondary school (Secondary Ratio) and high school (HighSchool Ratio) – each Ratio variable is derived by 
dividing the number of individuals possessing the relevant level of education by the number of individuals not 
possessing it. 
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In addition to these variables, we include the set of controls which are typically used in the literature on school 
enrolment in developing countries (Connelly & Zheng, 2003; De Carvalho Filho, 2012; Dostie & Jayaraman, 
2006; Gumus, 2014). Our control variables include child’s gender, age, whether she is indigenous, or she has 
a physical or mental disability, number of boys and girls in the household, whether the household is a 
beneficiary of a social program and characteristics of the household head such as gender, age and age squared. 
Controls at municipal level include municipality size, number of schools per child and outward migration 
intensity to the United States of America.iv  
Formally, we consider the probability of enrolment as a random variable following a binomial distribution: 
𝑌𝑖~𝐵(𝑛𝑖, 𝜋𝑖), 
with binomial denominator 𝑛𝑖 and probability of success 𝜋𝑖. The probability of school enrolment for children 
i, living in household h, clustered in municipality a, is estimated as the logit of the underlying probability 
𝜋𝑖ℎ𝑎 as a linear function of an array of explanatory variables: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑖ℎ𝑎) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎℎ + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑢ℎ + 𝛽3(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎℎ)(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑢ℎ) + 𝛿1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑎 +
𝛿3(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎)(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑎) + 𝛾𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖ℎ𝑎 + 𝜁𝑎 + 𝜇𝑖ℎ𝑎. 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎℎ is the wealth of the household h, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑢ℎ is the maximum years of education found in the 
household and (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎℎ)(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑢ℎ) is the interaction between these two variables. At the municipal level, 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎 represents inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑎 is the ratio of people with a certain 
level of education to those without that level of education and (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎)(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑎) is the interaction between 
these two variables. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖ℎ𝑎 includes the individual, household and aggregated level variables used as 
controls (see Table 1 for their full list and description). In our multilevel model, 𝛼 is the overall national 
intercept and the (2,452) municipal level intercepts are obtained through the algebraic sum 𝛼+𝜁𝑎. The 𝛽’s, 




We use data from the extended-questionnaire section of the 2010 Mexican census (Instituto National de 
Estadistica y Geografia, INEGI henceforth, 2010), which is statistically representative at municipal level and 
covers around 2.9 million households. Looking at Table 1, one can see that 49.5% of children in our age range 
of interest are girls, a fifth is indigenous and 1.8% suffers from a disability. The household head is on average 
44 years old and is a female in one sixth of total households. As expected, enrolment rates are notably different 
across the three age groups. Almost 96% of children in primary-school age attend school; this rate drops to 
82% for children in secondary-school age and it dramatically decreases to less than 50% for adolescents in 
high-school age. The lower enrolment rates for older children is not surprising; there is a greater expectation 
that they work and for them staying in school has a higher opportunity cost given that they can obtain higher 
salaries. The need to contribute economically to the household is a major determinant of school dropout in 
Mexico; for example, Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Salcedo (2012) find that an increase in school dropout was 
determined by the need to counter the decrease in remittances from the United States to Mexico in 2008-2009.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The spatial heterogeneity of our municipal level variables can be appreciated by looking at Figures 1, which 
displays two national maps of Mexico created by the authors on the basis of the INEGI (2010) data used. The 
first map (left panel) shows average school enrolment rates across municipalities (children aged 6-18 
combined, darker municipalities indicating higher enrolment), while the second map (right panel) reflects the 
variability in wealth inequality (darker municipalities indicating greater inequality). It can be noticed that while 
there are clusters of neighbouring municipalities having similar figures, at the same time there are also 
municipalities where figures for these variables differ considerably from those of their neighbours. The picture 
of marked spatial disparities emerging from Figure 1 tallies with the evidence on economic inequality in 
Mexico described in OECD (2016a, 2016b). Not only does Mexico, together with Chile, feature at the top of 
OECD countries in terms of income inequality with a Gini coefficient exceeding 0.45 (and consistently so over 
the past decade), but it is also the country with the highest regional differences in per capita income, measured 
by the range between the richest and the poorest regions. 




4.a Main results 
Results from our multilevel logit estimations are presented in Table 2. Two specifications are estimated for 
each age bracket; specifications (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) refer to the 6-12, 13-15 and 16-18 age ranges, 
respectively, and for each specification we report both raw coefficients and average marginal effects. Unlike 
specifications (1), (3) and (5), specifications (2), (4) and (6) include the interaction between adult educational 
attainments in the municipality and municipal wealth in line with the arguments laid out in our conceptual 
framework.  
[Table 2 about here] 
As can be seen in Table 2, household wealth and educational environment (at both household and municipal 
levels) are strong predictors of individual school enrolment (p<0.001); the wealthier the household and the 
greater the amount of education surrounding the child, the higher the probability that she is enrolled in school. 
The significance (p<0.001) with negative sign of mean municipal wealth points to the role of relative 
deprivation, which as we saw above is expected to be detrimental for school enrolment via its motivational and 
aspirational effects on both children and parents.v 
As to the Gini coefficient, while insignificant in specification (1) and (3) and positively significant in (5), it is 
constantly negative and significant (p<0.001) for all age ranges once the interaction between municipal wealth 
and the adult educational attainments is included – i.e. for all of specifications (2), (4), (6). Interacted terms are 
statistically significant (p<0.001) and specifications (2), (4), (6) neatly outperform specifications (1), (3) and 
(5) according to a number of goodness of fit statistics which are widely used to discern which among competing 
models best captures the variability in the data – see bottom rows of Table 2. Particularly meaningful in our 
case is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), because it penalises models more heavily for the use of 
additional regressors, making it more demanding for specifications with interaction terms to be preferred to 
those without. According to the criteria developed by Kass and Raftery (1995), the degree to which 
specifications (2), (4) and (6) are to be preferred to (1), (3) and (5) according to the BIC is ‘very strong’. Figure 
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2 shows graphically the predictive role of the Gini coefficient, with curves derived from specifications (2), (4) 
and (6) displayed on the same graph for expositional convenience.  The left panel shows that the probability of 
enrolment indeed declines over the inequality domain, and more markedly so for older children; the right panel 
shows that marginal effects are negative and significant for all age ranges (no confidence interval overlaps with 
zero, not shown here to keep the graph tidier) and are, as expected, more pronounced for older children. The 
negative coefficient for inequality is in line with the predictions of the models by Chiu (1998) and Checchi 
(2003), as well as of those of Perotti (1993) and García-Peñalosa (1995) for countries which are not at a very 
low level of economic development (as is the case for an upper-middle income country like Mexico), and does 
not offer support to the idea of economic inequality as an incentive to accumulate human capital. Kearney and 
Levine’s (2016) recent paper offers a possible explanation for this; inequality may trigger a sense of 
marginalisation in disadvantaged children which leads them to underestimate returns to education and hence 
to lower their investments in human capital formation – in a country like Mexico, this feeling is possibly 
reinforced by the fact that routes to higher economic status often abstract from meritocracy and legality. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
We carry out a number of robustness checks. Table 3 presents specifications (2), (4) and (6) estimated replacing 
the Gini with the Atkinson and Theil inequality indices - specifications (2A), (4A), (6A) and (2T), (4T), (6T), 
respectively. As can be seen in the table, the negative and significant sign of wealth inequality is confirmed 
using these alternative indices. In Table 4, we find further confirmation of the negative predictive role of 
inequality when the analysis is carried out by subsamples; specifically, the result holds for gender subsamples 
[specifications (2G), (4G), (6G) for girls and (2B), (4B), (6B) for boys] and for households below or above 
median wealth [specifications (2P), (4P), (6P) for poorer households and (2R), (4R), (6R) for richer 
households]. Finally, all the above results are confirmed if we replace our multilevel models with logit and 
linear probability models with standard errors clustered at municipal level (available upon request). 
[Table 3 about here] 
 [Table 4 about here] 
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Looking more closely at economic and educational variables at household level, it can be noticed that all the 
specifications reported in this paper include the interaction term between household wealth and mean education 
of adult in the households. These specifications outperform those without this interaction term as to their ability 
to fit the data, and including this interaction term does not influence sign or significance of the other regressors 
(results without this interaction term are available upon request). The interplay between household wealth and 
educational level sheds further light on the existence of a socio-economic gradient on school outcomes. The 
interaction term is significant (p<0.001), giving an indication of its overall relevance; nonetheless, an 
interpretation which solely relies on summary statistics such as coefficient and significance levels can be 
misleading in nonlinear models because these can differ at different values of the covariates (see Ai & Norton, 
2003; Greene, 2010).vi Following the suggestion of Greene (2010), we show graphically the behaviour of 
interacted explanatory variables by plotting the average predicted probabilities that our dependent variable 
takes a value of 1 (the child is enrolled in school) along the domain of one interacted variable at different levels 
of the other interacted variable. 
In particular, Figure 3 below shows for the three age ranges average predicted probabilities of school enrolment 
over the household educational domain at different levels of household wealth – each level of household wealth 
is represented by a specific curve, based on specifications (2), (4) and (6). It can be seen that, for all age ranges 
and for each level of household wealth, predicted probabilities increase with mean education in the household. 
In addition, as expected, these probabilities are higher for children in richer households. It should be noted that 
beyond these common features there are specific patterns and idiosyncrasies across the three age ranges. While 
being enrolled at age 6-12 is almost a certainty for richest households (the relevant curves are basically flat and 
equal 1 over the whole educational domain), it is not so for less wealthy households – the probability of 
enrolment falling below 70% for children in households with low wealth and formal education. Interestingly, 
school enrolment becomes a certainty regardless of wealth when mean household education exceeds high 
school level; this shows how for early school enrolment lack of economic wealth can be to some extent 
compensated by the ‘educational wealth’ possessed by the household. In the case of the 13-15 age range, 
wealth-based differences in predicted probabilities tend to be mitigated at higher levels of household education, 
to the point that they tend to converge only at the very end of the educational spectrum – at educational levels 
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which for poorest households are mostly off-sample. With regard to the 16-18 age range, wealth-based 
differences in the probability of enrolment are more marked in the middle of the educational spectrum; this 
suggests that for this age group, heterogeneity in school enrolment is greater among households in the middle 
of the socio-economic ladder than among those at the top or at the bottom – where presumably still being in 
education is, respectively, very common and very uncommon. Finally, it can be noticed that while for wealthy 
households the curve is concave along the whole domain, for most households it is initially convex before 
turning concave; this indicates that for high school age, potential benefits of an additional unit of adult 
education in the household may be initially increasing rather than decreasing. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
4.b Additional insights and municipal random effects 
Additional insights emerge from other explanatory variables. Being a girl rather than a boy seems to increase 
the probability of being enrolled in school, in particular for the 16-18 age range; this is consistent with the 
general reversal of the educational gender gap in Latin America (World Bank, 2012). The negative coefficient 
for household size, wealth being controlled for, captures how resources need to be stretched among more family 
members, reducing resources available for investing in education. Having a disability lowers the probability of 
being enrolled, while the opposite holds for being a beneficiary of a social program and the availability of 
schools (in particular for children beyond primary school age). The negative sign of child age for the 13-15 
and 16-18 age ranges reflects greater opportunity costs for older children to be enrolled in school; the positive 
sign for the 6-12 range is mainly driven by the greater likelihood of enrolment for children aged 8, 9 and 10 
compared to younger children (some children enrol in school late), while at age 11 and 12 drop-out dynamics 
start coming into play decreasing the probability of enrolment.vii The negative coefficient for female household 
head is not surprising because in most cases such characteristic in Mexico identifies single-mother households. 
Similar to Debowicz and Golan (2014), we find some evidence that school enrolment increases with the age 
of the household head – possibly because older parents are more mature, or tend to spend longer time engaging 
in educational activities with their children (McWayne & Melzi, 2014).      
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The level of outward migration can have a positive or a negative effect on investment in education (see Halpern-
Manners, 2011). On the one hand, remittances increase disposable income at home, relieving economic barriers 
to education (Edwards & Ureta, 2003); on the other hand, living in a municipality with high migration may 
disincentivise investment in education because greater connections with migrants increase migration 
opportunities and human capital acquired in Mexico tends to be poorly remunerated in the United States 
(Massey & Espinosa, 1997). In line with the results of López-Córdova (2005), we find that outward migration 
is a positive predictor for younger children and a negative predictor for older children – in addition, our 
estimations split by gender suggest that the negative effect may be stronger for boys, as described by McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2011). 
Finally, we find that being indigenous is a negative predictor of school enrolment. While this result may not 
surprise, it should be noted that Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012) find that, ceteris paribus, indigenous 
children are more likely to be enrolled in school than non-indigenous children. We do find an exception to the 
negative patter which is prevailing in both our pooled-sample and split-sample estimations, namely the positive 
sign for the indigenous dummy in regressions (4B) and (6B). A potential explanation for this is that indigenous 
boys benefit from a double advantage compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. First, they live 
predominantly in rural areas, which have been the target of massive educational expansion (Santibañez, 
Vernez, & Razquin, 2005; UNESCO, 2007). Second, in indigenous families investment in education is 
concentrated on boys, with girls being expected to perform household chores along traditional gender roles 
(Rocha & Latapí, 2016; Saraví, Abrantes, & Bertely-Busquets, 2014). 
We now turn to the analysis of municipal random effects. In Figure 1 above we illustrated how enrolment 
rates vary across municipalities; clearly, this simple illustration does not take any correlates into account – a 
municipality may have higher enrolment rates due to a richer educational environment, greater school 
availability, etc. The analysis of municipal effects emerging from our estimations enables us to report on the 
differences in the probability of enrolment across municipalities which remain after all our explanatory 
variables are controlled for. More precisely, consider that the right hand side of our econometric models can 
be simplified as β0+βX+βj, where βX refers to the vector of explanatory variables and their estimated 
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coefficients, while β0 and βj are two constant terms. The former represents the country-level intercept and the 
latter is a parameter which is specific to municipality j; in other words, in the calculations of their predicted 
probabilities all individuals in the sample share parameter β0 and all individuals living in municipality j share 
βj. A positive (negative) value of βj implies a positive (negative) contribution to the probability of enrolment 
due to living in municipality j. Figure 4 plots the βj’s for the 2,452 Mexican municipalities in our models, 
arranged on the horizontal axis simply on the basis of their municipality code. As can be seen, there is a 
considerable spatial heterogeneity in the contribution to the probability of enrolment given by the municipal 
random effect. We report the names of two municipalities in each panel to give an examples of how highly 
different random effects can be found for municipalities within the same state. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
In Figure 5 we illustrate the spatial heterogeneity in the probability of enrolment by focusing on a 
geographically restricted case study. In this figure, we plot predicted probabilities for three children of 
primary school age who are identical in all respects other than the municipality they live inviii –these are 
Guadalajara (the capital of the state of Jalisco) and two adjacent municipalities in the Guadalajara 
Metropolitan Area, namely Zapopan and Tonalá. In this way, any difference in their predicted probability 
curves is determined by unobserved factors related to the municipality children live in. We plot probabilities 
of enrolment at different values of household wealth, so that we can see what happens to differences between 
municipalities at different points of the household wealth distributional spectrum. As can be seen in Figure 5, 
living in the capital or in Zapopan produces virtually no difference in the probability of being enrolled in 
school; conversely, living in Tonalá brings about a sizeable reduction in predicted probabilities. This 
reduction is particularly noticeable for poorer households, while for wealthy ones the differences across 
municipalities lessens. 




Taking advantage of the large dataset provided by the extended section of the 2010 Mexican census, we have 
carried out an empirical analysis of the determinants of school enrolment. Our main explanatory variables of 
interest are wealth inequality and the educational environment surrounding the child within and beyond the 
household. In line with the conceptual framework we have drawn on the basis of economic, sociological, 
educational and psychological literatures, our results provide robust evidence of wealth inequality as a negative 
predictor of school enrolment and of a positive role played by the educational environment. Our work 
contributes to the literature also by highlighting the importance of accounting for how educational and 
economic variables are intertwined – both within and beyond the household. The introduction of interaction 
terms between economic and educational variables improves the ability of our models to fit the data, and 
graphical analysis of interacted variables shows considerable heterogeneity in the predictive role of adult 
education for households at different standards of livings.  Last but not least, our evidence illustrates the 
disparity in the probability of being enrolled in school across municipalities, shedding important light on the 
character of spatial inequalities in Mexico. 
Our contribution raises important issues for researchers to take forward and offers valuable insights to 
policymakers. On the first count, natural extensions of our work would be to explore the relationships we found 
using datasets containing individual income, polytomous measures of educational outcomes (test scores, 
grades, etc.), or to focus on higher education. We also hope our work encourages future research on educational 
inequalities, in particular with the aim of disentangling contextual effects of economic inequality (impinging 
on everyone in an unequal society) from those related to relative deprivation (affecting those lagging behind 
more successful others). Our interest in the interaction between municipal-level economic and educational 
variables motivated our use of mean wealth, but abstracting from this specific issue a valuable perspective can 
be gained by adopting idiosyncratic indices of relative deprivation – able to differentiate the level of relative 
deprivation experienced by individuals or households at different standards of living.  
On the second count, our work highlights at least three issues for policymakers. The first is that economic 
disparities are detrimental to school enrolment; this suggests an education-based motivation for supporting 
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redistributive policies. At the same time, as recommended by Mayer (2010), these should be accompanied by 
specific measures targeting directly those socio-economic profiles for which access to schooling is found to be 
problematic and school dropout more likely; in this respect, our evidence points to households which are 
economically deprived, single-mother headed, with numerous children, etc. Secondly, our work also 
strengthens the idea that the benefits accruing from extending education are cumulative across generations. 
Increasing the level of education of today’s children will in turn boost that of tomorrow’s children; our research 
indicates that if average adult education within the household were around high-school level this might enable 
virtually 100% enrolment rate of children in primary school age. In addition, enhancing the attainment of high 
school level education for adults would yield increasing returns for the enrolment of pupils in the 16-18 age 
range for a wide proportion of households. A target of universal high school education for the new generations 
may currently seem utopian, but it is a goal which Mexico, as an upper-middle income country, OECD member 
and net contributor to a number of United Nations agencies, cannot but take seriously. A final issue for 
policymakers to be aware of, and concerned with, is the disparity in the probability of being enrolled in school 
across municipalities. An effort should be made to tackle the sources of inequality in school enrolment 
illustrated in this paper. Education cannot be a prize for the children who are lucky enough to pick the right 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Observations Mean / 
Proportion 
SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
6-12 year old attendance 1,461,364 0.959 0.199 0 1 
13-15 year old attendance 629,079 0.822 0.382 0 1 
16-18 year old attendance 623,667 0.489 0.499 0 1 
Individual Level Variables 
Female 2,714,110 0.495 0.5 0 1 
Age    2,714,110 12.011 3.737 6 18 
Disability 2,714,110 0.018 0.134 0 1 
Indigenous 2,714,110 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Household Level Variables 
Household wealth 1,327,350 5.704 2.343 0 11.616 
Household Size 1,327,350 5.264 1.984 2 38 
Female HH head  1,327,350 0.167 0.373 0 1 
HH head age    1,327,350 44.299 12.614 12 130 
HH Max Ed (years of schooling) 1,327,350 9.917 3.533 0 24 
Social program beneficiary   1,327,350 0.223 0.416 0 1 
Municipal Level Variables 
Municipal Gini   2,452 0.170 0.050 0.041 0.378 
Municipal Theil 2,452 0.050 0.028 0.006 0.227 
Municipal Atkinson 2,452 0.052 0.028 0.004 0.230 
Mean municipal wealth 2,452 5.350 1.547 1.665 9.205 
Primary ratioa 2,452 1.025 0.779 0.085 11.936 
Secondary ratioa 2,452 0.170 0.144 0.001 2.512 
HighSchool ratioa    2,452 0.087 0.102 0.000 1.765 
Schools per child 2,452 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.059 
Municipality size    2,452 45,792 132,858 93 1,815,786 
Municipal migration intensity index 2,452 2.700 2.311 0 14.360 
Note: Data from INEGI, Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO) and Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos 
(SIMBAD, which is part of INEGI). The migration variable is an index for outward migration to the United States 
(see endnote iv for further details). 










Table 2. Determinants of individual school enrolment by age range – Multilevel logit models 
 6-12 Year Old 13-15 Year Old 16-18 Year Old 
                     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                     GINI+MEAN+RATIO GINI+MEAN*RATIO GINI+MEAN+RATIO GINI+MEAN*RATIO GINI+MEAN+RATIO GINI+MEAN*RATIO 
 Raw AME Raw AME Raw AME Raw AME Raw AME Raw AME 
HH Wealth                 0.520***      0.008***      0.519***      0.009***      0.359***      0.022***      0.357***      0.022***      0.409***      0.032***      0.408***      0.032*** 
                        (0.006)       (0.000)       (0.006)       (0.000)       (0.007)       (0.000)       (0.007)       (0.000)       (0.007)       (0.000)       (0.007)       (0.000)    
HH Max Ed                 0.365***      0.007***      0.363***      0.007***      0.416***      0.037***      0.413***      0.037***      0.504***      0.069***      0.501***      0.069*** 
                        (0.003)       (0.000)       (0.003)       (0.000)       (0.004)       (0.000)       (0.004)       (0.000)       (0.004)       (0.000)       (0.004)       (0.000)    
HHWealth*HH Max Ed       -0.037***                -0.036***                -0.020***                -0.020***                -0.022***                -0.022***            
                        (0.001)                     (0.001)                     (0.001)                     (0.001)                     (0.001)                     (0.001)                  
Mun Gini                 -0.154        -0.005        -1.607***     -0.053***     -0.256        -0.030        -2.396***     -0.281***      0.569*       0.104*     -2.002***     -0.363*** 
                        (0.341)       (0.011)       (0.348)       (0.012)       (0.296)       (0.035)       (0.313)       (0.037)       (0.260)       (0.047)       (0.286)       (0.052)    
Mun Wealth               -0.279***     -0.009***     -0.272***     -0.014***     -0.291***     -0.034***     -0.314***     -0.054***     -0.232***     -0.042***     -0.295***     -0.080*** 
                        (0.014)       (0.000)       (0.013)       (0.001)       (0.012)       (0.001)       (0.012)       (0.002)       (0.010)       (0.002)       (0.010)       (0.003)    
Primary Ratio             0.198***      0.006***      1.500***      0.023***                                                                                                                 
                        (0.022)       (0.001)       (0.103)       (0.002)                                                                                                                    
MunWealth*Primary Ratio                                -0.162***                                                                                                                            
                                                    (0.013)                                                                                                                                  
Secondary Ratio                                                                  1.770***      0.207***      8.792***      0.492***                                                         
                                                                                (0.108)       (0.013)       (0.448)       (0.022)                                                            
MunWealth*Secondary Ratio                                                                                         -0.892***                                                                    
                                                                                                            (0.055)                                                                          
HighSchool Ratio                                                                                                                          1.643***      0.299***     12.150***      0.907*** 
                                                                                                                                        (0.112)       (0.020)       (0.613)       (0.039)    
MunWealth*HighSchool                                                                                                                                                -1.295***  
                                                                                                                                                                    (0.074)                  
Female                    0.025***      0.001***      0.025***      0.001***      0.003         0.000         0.003         0.000         0.048***      0.009***      0.048***      0.009*** 
                        (0.009)       (0.000)       (0.009)       (0.000)       (0.007)       (0.001)       (0.007)       (0.001)       (0.006)       (0.001)       (0.006)       (0.001)    
Age                       0.039***      0.001***      0.039***      0.001***     -0.750***     -0.087***     -0.749***     -0.088***     -0.664***     -0.121***     -0.664***     -0.120*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.005)       (0.001)       (0.005)       (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.001)    
Mental or Physical Disability     -2.224***     -0.174***     -2.224***     -0.177***     -1.176***     -0.175***     -1.176***     -0.175***     -0.435***     -0.078***     -0.434***     -0.078*** 
                        (0.017)       (0.003)       (0.017)       (0.003)       (0.022)       (0.004)       (0.022)       (0.004)       (0.023)       (0.004)       (0.023)       (0.004)    
Indigenous               -0.074***     -0.002***     -0.051***     -0.002***      0.024         0.003         0.043***      0.005***     -0.003        -0.001         0.007         0.001    
                        (0.019)       (0.001)       (0.019)       (0.001)       (0.016)       (0.002)       (0.016)       (0.002)       (0.014)       (0.003)       (0.014)       (0.002)    
Number of People in HH     -0.110***     -0.004***     -0.109***     -0.004***     -0.102***     -0.012***     -0.102***     -0.012***     -0.114***     -0.021***     -0.114***     -0.021*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.001)       (0.000)       (0.001)       (0.000)    
Female HH Head           -0.322***     -0.011***     -0.323***     -0.012***     -0.290***     -0.035***     -0.291***     -0.036***     -0.185***     -0.034***     -0.186***     -0.034*** 
                        (0.013)       (0.001)       (0.013)       (0.001)       (0.010)       (0.001)       (0.010)       (0.001)       (0.008)       (0.001)       (0.008)       (0.001)    
HH Head Age              -0.033***     -0.000***     -0.033***     -0.000***      0.014***     -0.000***      0.014***     -0.000***      0.092***      0.003***      0.093***      0.003*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.002)       (0.000)       (0.001)       (0.000)       (0.001)       (0.000)    
HH Head Age Squared       2.20e-04 ***            2.18e-04 ***            -1.72e-04***            -1.74e-04***            -8.31e-04***            -8.31e-04***            
                        (0.000)                     (0.000)                     (0.000)                     (0.000)                     (0.000)                     (0.000)                  
Social Program            0.287***      0.009***      0.288***      0.009***      0.188***      0.021***      0.190***      0.022***      0.117***      0.021***      0.119***      0.021*** 
                        (0.011)       (0.000)       (0.011)       (0.000)       (0.009)       (0.001)       (0.009)       (0.001)       (0.008)       (0.001)       (0.008)       (0.001)    
Municipal Schools per Child      3.039         0.097         6.387***      0.211***      9.291***      1.084***     12.184***      1.430***      2.574         0.469         7.773***      1.410*** 
                        (2.216)       (0.071)       (2.171)       (0.072)       (1.856)       (0.217)       (1.793)       (0.211)       (1.594)       (0.290)       (1.539)       (0.279)    
Municipality Size (Pop 1000s)     -4.00e-07***     -0.000*** -1.68e-07*      -0.000*      -3.53e-07***     -0.000***      -7.17e-08       -0.000        -2.57e-07***     -0.000***     -7.46e-08       -0.000    
                        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)    
Municipal Migration Rate      0.044***      0.001***      0.059***      0.002***     -0.015***     -0.002***      0.001         0.000        -0.049***     -0.009***     -0.037***     -0.007*** 
                        (0.006)       (0.000)       (0.005)       (0.000)       (0.005)       (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.001)    
Constant                     2.071***                 1.894***                 9.323***                 9.485***                 4.481***                 4.983***            
                        (0.126)                     (0.123)                     (0.132)                     (0.129)                     (0.120)                     (0.120)                  
Obs.                  1,461,364      1,461,364        629,079        629,079        623,667        623,667     
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BIC                     433,084        432,936        479,634        479,400        664,685        664,412     
Level 2 SD 0.4348  0.4132  0.3903  0.3663  .03509  0.3244  
LL                     -216,400       -216,319       -239,684       -239,560       -332,209       -332,066     
LR test H0: Logit = Multilevel Logit:            
Chi2 6,509.74  5,641.16  6,891.64  5,873.84  7,488.14  6,333.04  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
  Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at .05, .01 and .001 level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Robustness check - alternative measures of inequality 
                     6-12 Year Old 13-15 Year Old 16-18 Year Old 












HH Wealth                 0.519***      0.519***      0.357***      0.357***      0.408***      0.408*** 
                        (0.006)       (0.006)       (0.007)       (0.007)       (0.007)       (0.007)    
HH Max Ed                 0.362***      0.362***      0.413***      0.413***      0.501***      0.501*** 
                        (0.003)       (0.003)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.004)    
HHWealth*HH Max Ed       -0.036***     -0.036***     -0.020***     -0.020***     -0.022***     -0.022*** 
                        (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)    
Theil Index              -2.687***               -3.395***                  -2.392***               
                        (0.535)                     (0.480)                     (0.438)                  
Atkinson Index                      -2.744***               -3.373***                  -2.365*** 
                                      (0.519)                     (0.468)                     (0.427)    
Mun Wealth               -0.270***     -0.266***     -0.300***     -0.296***     -0.276***     -0.273*** 
                        (0.013)       (0.012)       (0.011)       (0.011)       (0.010)       (0.009)    
Primary Ratio             1.461***      1.480***                                                         
                        (0.100)       (0.100)                                                            
MunWealth*Primary Ratio     -0.157***     -0.160***                                                         
                        (0.012)       (0.012)                                                            
Secondary Ratio                                    8.325***      8.454***                             
                                                    (0.428)       (0.434)                                
MunWealth*Secondary Ratio                             -0.833***     -0.850***                             
                                                    (0.053)       (0.053)                                
HighSchool Ratio                                                              11.285***     11.405*** 
                                                                                (0.581)       (0.590)    
MunWealth*HighSchool                                                            -1.190***     -1.205*** 
                                                                                (0.071)       (0.072)    
Female                    0.025***      0.025***      0.003         0.003         0.048***      0.048*** 
                        (0.009)       (0.009)       (0.007)       (0.007)       (0.006)       (0.006)    
Age                       0.039***      0.039***     -0.749***     -0.749***     -0.664***     -0.664*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.004)       (0.004)    
Mental or Physical Disability     -2.224***     -2.224***     -1.176***     -1.176***     -0.435***     -0.435*** 
                        (0.017)       (0.017)       (0.022)       (0.022)       (0.023)       (0.023)    
Indigenous               -0.048*      -0.049***      0.047***      0.046***      0.011         0.010    
                        (0.019)       (0.019)       (0.016)       (0.016)       (0.014)       (0.014)    
Number of People in HH     -0.109***     -0.109***     -0.102***     -0.102***     -0.114***     -0.114*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.001)       (0.001)    
Female HH Head           -0.323***     -0.323***     -0.291***     -0.291***     -0.187***     -0.187*** 
                        (0.013)       (0.013)       (0.010)       (0.010)       (0.008)       (0.008)    
HH Head Age              -0.033***     -0.033***      0.014***      0.014***      0.093***      0.093*** 
                        (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.001)       (0.001)    
HH Head Age Squared       2.18e-04***      2.18e-04***     1.74e-04***     1.74e-04***     -8.31e-04***     -8.31e-04*** 
                        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)    
Social Program            0.288***      0.288***      0.190***      0.190***      0.119***      0.119*** 
                        (0.011)       (0.011)       (0.009)       (0.009)       (0.008)       (0.008)    
Municipal Schools per Child      6.921***      7.199***     12.452***     12.713***      7.546***      7.747*** 
                        (2.185)       (2.191)       (1.806)       (1.811)       (1.553)       (1.560)    
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Municipality Size (Pop 1000s)     -1.61e-07*      -1.63e-07*      -7.02e-08    -6.99e-08 -7.56e-08 -7.43e-08 
                        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)    
Municipal Migration Rate      0.058***      0.059***     -0.001        -0.000        -0.038***     -0.038*** 
                        (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.004)    
Constant                  1.748***      1.731***      9.198***      9.170***      4.685***      4.667*** 
                        (0.101)       (0.098)       (0.111)       (0.109)       (0.102)       (0.100)    
Obs.                  1,461,364     1,461,364       629,079       629,079       623,667       623,667    
BIC                     432,932       432,929       479,408       479,406       664,431       664,430    
Level 2 SD                       0.4126  0.4122              0.3667 0.3666 0.3261 0.3260 
LL                     -216,317      -216,316      -239,564      -239,563      -332,075      -332,075    
LR test H0: Logit = Multilevel Logit:      
Chi2                   5,601.37      5,616.47      5,892.21      5,877.43      6,387.98      6,369.11    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at .05, .01 and .001 level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Robustness check – subsamples by gender and standard of living 
                     Sample Split by Gender Sample Split by Wealth 
                     6-12 Year Olds 13-15 Year Olds 16-18 Year Olds 6-12 Year Olds 13-15 Year Olds 16-18 Year Olds 
























HH Wealth                 0.525***      0.516***      0.357***      0.364***      0.457***      0.359***      0.574***      0.526***      0.270***      0.609***      0.163***      0.818*** 
                        (0.009)       (0.009)       (0.010)       (0.009)       (0.009)       (0.009)       (0.011)       (0.028)       (0.014)       (0.025)       (0.017)       (0.019)    
HH Max Ed                 0.377***      0.353***      0.410***      0.423***      0.530***      0.479***      0.376***      0.373***      0.406***      0.489***      0.471***      0.646*** 
                        (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.006)       (0.006)       (0.006)       (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.018)       (0.006)       (0.018)       (0.007)       (0.013)    
HHWealth*HH Max Ed       -0.039***     -0.034***     -0.020***     -0.021***     -0.027***     -0.017***     -0.041***     -0.037***     -0.014***     -0.034***     -0.007***     -0.045*** 
                        (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.001)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)    
Mun Gini                 -1.515***     -1.613***     -2.145***     -2.379***     -1.806***     -2.051***     -1.433***     -0.993        -2.195***     -2.780***     -2.169***     -2.529*** 
                        (0.408)       (0.383)       (0.357)       (0.359)       (0.328)       (0.324)       (0.409)       (0.618)       (0.353)       (0.527)       (0.344)       (0.386)    
Mun Wealth               -0.248***     -0.279***     -0.272***     -0.346***     -0.258***     -0.326***     -0.285***     -0.174***     -0.313***     -0.299***     -0.271***     -0.306*** 
                        (0.016)       (0.015)       (0.014)       (0.014)       (0.012)       (0.012)       (0.016)       (0.028)       (0.014)       (0.023)       (0.012)       (0.017)    
Primary Ratio             1.578***      1.459***                                                         1.712***      1.056***                                                         
                        (0.121)       (0.113)                                                            (0.133)       (0.139)                                                            
MunWealth*Primary Ratio     -0.171***     -0.158***                                                             -0.182***     -0.116***                                                         
                        (0.015)       (0.014)                                                            (0.017)       (0.016)                                                            
Secondary Ratio                                       9.396***      8.241***                                                              8.968***      9.324***                             
                                                    (0.524)       (0.516)                                                               (0.554)       (0.626)                                
MunWealth*Secondary Ratio                             -0.947***     -0.837***                                                         -0.900***     -0.967***                             
                                                    (0.065)       (0.063)                                                               (0.075)       (0.074)                                
HighSchool Ratio                                                             12.046***     11.865***                                                         13.592***     11.568*** 
                                                                               (0.693)       (0.688)                                                              (0.835)       (0.654)    
MunWealth*HighSchool                                                         -1.296***     -1.246***                                                         -1.490***     -1.246*** 
                                                                               (0.084)       (0.083)                                                              (0.110)       (0.078)    
Female                                                                                                      0.015         0.062***     -0.082***      0.186***     -0.019*       0.128*** 
                                                                                                         (0.010)       (0.018)       (0.009)       (0.013)       (0.008)       (0.009)    
Age                       0.037***      0.040***     -0.750***     -0.753***     -0.674***     -0.655***      0.060***     -0.021***     -0.763***     -0.727***     -0.727***     -0.602*** 
                        (0.003)       (0.003)       (0.007)       (0.007)       (0.006)       (0.005)       (0.003)       (0.004)       (0.006)       (0.009)       (0.005)       (0.006)    
Mental or Physical Disability     -2.302***     -2.156***     -1.151***     -1.192***     -0.409***     -0.460***     -2.293***     -2.122***     -1.080***     -1.312***     -0.315***     -0.542*** 
                        (0.026)       (0.023)       (0.034)       (0.030)       (0.035)       (0.032)       (0.021)       (0.028)       (0.029)       (0.035)       (0.033)       (0.033)    
Indigenous               -0.085***      0.007        -0.027         0.160***     -0.108***      0.141***     -0.046*      -0.334***      0.045***     -0.353***     -0.001        -0.404*** 
                        (0.026)       (0.025)       (0.021)       (0.022)       (0.019)       (0.019)       (0.020)       (0.078)       (0.017)       (0.051)       (0.015)       (0.034)    
Number of People in HH     -0.110***     -0.110***     -0.102***     -0.103***     -0.121***     -0.116***     -0.116***     -0.095***     -0.089***     -0.135***     -0.083***     -0.164*** 
                        (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.004)       (0.002)       (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.002)    
Female HH Head           -0.259***     -0.386***     -0.231***     -0.352***     -0.128***     -0.254***     -0.370***     -0.257***     -0.285***     -0.296***     -0.159***     -0.200*** 
                        (0.019)       (0.017)       (0.015)       (0.014)       (0.012)       (0.012)       (0.016)       (0.022)       (0.013)       (0.017)       (0.012)       (0.011)    
HH Head Age              -0.027***     -0.038***      0.032***     -0.005*        0.128***      0.039***     -0.044***      0.001         0.011***      0.020***      0.099***      0.081*** 
                        (0.003)       (0.003)       (0.003)       (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.002)       (0.004)       (0.002)       (0.004)       (0.002)       (0.002)    




















                        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)    
Social Program            0.290***      0.288***      0.206***      0.173***      0.156***      0.065***      0.329***      0.154***      0.187***      0.233***      0.079***      0.207*** 
                        (0.016)       (0.016)       (0.013)       (0.013)       (0.011)       (0.011)       (0.013)       (0.030)       (0.010)       (0.020)       (0.010)       (0.014)    
Municipal Schools per Child      6.433*       7.150***     14.030***      9.798***     10.927***      5.771***      7.424***      3.916         9.338***     19.895***      4.968***     11.167*** 
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                        (2.658)       (2.495)       (2.120)       (2.093)       (1.817)       (1.787)       (2.534)       (3.473)       (2.027)       (2.686)       (1.861)       (1.875)    
Municipality Size (Pop 
1000s) 






-1.52e-07* -7.08e-08 -1.14e-07 -8.62e-08* 
                        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)    
Municipal Migration Rate      0.065***      0.055***      0.005         0.000        -0.028***     -0.046***      0.068***      0.052***      0.009*       -0.007        -0.033***     -0.041*** 
                        (0.007)       (0.006)       (0.005)       (0.005)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.006)       (0.008)       (0.005)       (0.006)       (0.005)       (0.004)    
Constant                  1.586***      2.046***      8.716***     
10.174*** 
     3.781***      6.656***      1.839***      0.743*       9.901***      7.385***      6.317***      1.788*** 
                        (0.151)       (0.143)       (0.163)       (0.165)       (0.153)       (0.154)       (0.143)       (0.335)       (0.151)       (0.305)       (0.157)       (0.229)    
Obs.                    720,815       740,549       311,693       317,386       309,708       313,959       823,145       638,219       350,959       278,120       333,937       289,730    
BIC                     210,173       223,620       235,414       243,779       327,183       335,934       307,189       125,283       317,179       161,622       352,104       309,203    
Level 2 SD           0.4353              0.4044 0.3752 0.3812 0.3379 0.3358 0.4727              0.3623              0.3962 0.3442 0.3656 0.2691              
LL                     -104,952      -111,675      -117,580      -121,763      -163,465      -167,841      -153,452       -62,501      -158,456       -80,679      -175,919      -154,470    
LR test H0: Logit = Multilevel Logit:            
Chi2                   2,656.74      2,177.31      2,684.24      2,670.96      2,954.72      2,972.02      5,022.85        546.68      4,426.07      1,044.60      4,244.26      1,571.12    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at .05, .01 and .001 level, respectively.
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Figure 1. Municipal school enrolment rates and Gini coefficient 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from census data (INEGI, 2010) using STATA 'spmap' command 
 
 














Figures 3. Predicted probabilities –  
education at different levels of wealth (household level)  
 



























Figure 4. Scatter plot of municipal random effects  
 


















































i See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997), Takata (2003), Uslaner and Brown (2005), Elgar and Aitken (2011), de Vries, 
Gosling and Potter (2011), Loughnan et al. (2011), Neville (2012), Piff et al. (2012), Piff et al.  Trautmann, van de Kuilen and 
Zeckhauser (2013) and Piff (2014). 
ii See Peugh (2010), Reiter and Raghunathan (2007), and Gutiérrez, Carter and Drukker  (2001) for technical discussions of the log-
likelihood ratio test and Valentine, Verdes-Tennant, and Bonsel (2015) and Vu, Lee and Muhajarine (2013) for empirical 
applications. Results from our log-likelihood ratio tests (Chi2 statistics and the p-values) can be found at the end of our regression 
tables. 
iii Standard Principal Components Analysis (PCA) assumes that the variables are multivariate normal. Following Kolenikov and 
Angeles (2009), we run PCA using polychoric correlations to better approximate the normality assumption and estimate the 
amount of variation explained by the first component. Finally, it should be noted that financial assets are not included in our 
measure of wealth because unavailable in the survey – we do not expect this to have created a relevant bias in out use of wealth as 
a predictor of school enrolment. 
iv The migration index used in the analysis is calculated by the Mexican National Population Council on the basis of the percentage 
of households that receive remittances, percentage of households with members in USA, percentage of households with visiting 
members who live in the USA and percentage of households with returning members who lived in the USA between 2005 and 2010. 
v We remark that this interpretation of mean asset index relates to these specific models – as extensively explained by the body of 
literature quoted above. The use of mean asset index as explanatory variable in an OLS model where the dependent variable is 
municipal enrolment rates reveals (as expected) a positive and significant coefficient – results available upon request.  
vi The introduction of an interaction term in a logit model allows for heterogeneity in the shape (rather than only in the position) of 
the curve representing the conditional probability that the dependent variable equals 1 as a function of the explanatory variable of 
interest; in other words, it allows this shape to differ at different levels of the interacted variable. This means that if a continuous 
variable is interacted with a dummy variable, we will have two possible shapes for this curve – one for each value of the dummy 
variable; if two continuous variables are interacted then we would have many (virtually infinite) shapes. 
vii The analysis using age dummies is available upon request.  
viii For this analysis, continuous explanatory variables are set to mean values and dummies are set to zero (therefore this child is 
male, non indigenous, does not have any disability, etc.) 
 
 
                                                 
